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| Registros recuperados: 30 | |
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| Hueth, Brent; Ibarburu, Maro A.; Kliebenstein, James B.. |
| We study business organization and coordination of specialty-market hog production using a comparative analysis of two Iowa pork niche-marketing firms. We describe and analyze each firm's management of five key organizational challenges: planning and logistics, quality assurance, process verification and management of "credence attributes," business structure, and profit sharing. Although each firm is engaged in essentially the same activity, there are substantial differences across the two firms in the way production and marketing are coordinated. These differences are partly explained by the relative size and age of each firm, thus highlighting the importance of organizational evolution in agricultural markets, but are also partly the result of a formal... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Specialty hogs; Coordination; Contracting; Organizational design; Niche markets; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18340 |
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| Babcock, Bruce A.; Beghin, John C.; Duffy, Michael D.; Feng, Hongli; Hueth, Brent; Kling, Catherine L.; Kurkalova, Lyubov A.; Schneider, Uwe A.; Secchi, Silvia; Weninger, Quinn; Zhao, Jinhua. |
| As Congress develops new farm legislation, some are lobbying for a new partnership between U.S. taxpayers and farmers. In exchange for an annual transfer of $10 to $20 billion from taxpayers to agriculture, farmers would do much more to enhance environmental quality. An attractive feature of a new partnership is that paying for an improved environment provides a clear and justifiable rationale for farm program payments, something that is lacking under current farm programs. By changing management practices and land use, farmers can provide cleaner water, cleaner air, better wildlife habitat, lower net greenhouse gas emissions, and improved long-run soil quality. Private profit maximizers largely ignore the value of these environmental goods. Hence, the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Land Economics/Use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36920 |
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| Fukunaga, Keita; Hueth, Brent. |
| In modern U.S. agriculture, a tenant typically contracts with more than one landlord, although most of the past literature has focused exclusively on bilateral contracts with a single tenant and a single landlord. We argue that, in the presence of contractual externalities under which the landlords do not cooperatively act, multilateral contracting results in higher-powered contracts for the tenant, due to inefficient competition among the landlords, and that this incentive effect becomes a motivation for the use of cash rental contacts. Using the USDAfs AELOS data set, we show that the number of landlords per tenant indeed increases the likelihood of cash rent and changes the qualitative properties of the contract choice equation. These outcomes provide... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21368 |
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| Fulton, Murray E.; Hueth, Brent. |
| The cases assembled in this special issue provide a rich setting for an examination of a number of cooperative conversion and restructurings that have occurred over the last 10 years. The cases also provide some lessons on the larger cooperative problems and questions in which cooperative researchers have been interested. The cases suggest that some of the conversions and restructurings are due to what can simply be called poor management, something that is not unique to co-ops, but is in fact common to all business enterprises regardless of their structure. At the same time, the cases also point out that common structural problems associated with cooperatives – such as lack of capital, property right problems and portfolio problems – do have an impact on... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56894 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
| Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that fails to attract non-farm, or "private" investment? We hypothesize that doing so is a costly mechanism for increasing the maximum penalty farmers face in the case of business failure. For a given market environment, exposing farmers to this risk increases the amount of surplus that can be used to repay lenders, thus expanding the set of market environments in which financing is available. We show how equity investment of this sort can be an efficient organizational response to a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Corporate finance; Moral hazard; Vertical integration; Agribusiness; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18610 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
| We use historical variation in the market share of agricultural cooperatives to examine the nature of the cooperative firm. Our data include the share of sectoral output accounted for by cooperative firms across 15 commodity sectors during the period 1930-2002. We test a simple financial contracting model where the cooperative firm is viewed as a particular implementation of "monitored credit" (or "informed intermediation"). Controlling for sectoral and year effects, we find support for the main prediction of our model with a positive and statistically significant relationship between cooperative market share and real annual lending rates. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19324 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
| Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that (apparently) fails to attract non-farm or "private" investment? We hypothesize that farm capital is high cost, relative to that provided by private entrepreneurs (or in other words, that there is a degree of asset fixity in farm capital) but that it engenders greater organizational commitment-which is particularly important when expected market returns are low-on the part of producers. This commitment arises from the indirect incentive properties associated with at-risk capital. We... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Corporate financing; Moral hazard; Vertical integration; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18478 |
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| Ginder, Roger G.; Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| The West Liberty Foods turkey cooperative was formed in 1996 to purchase the assets and assume operations of Louis Rich Foods (an investor-owned processing firm), which, at the time, announced the imminent shutdown of its West Liberty, Iowa, processing facility. We study the creation and performance of this "new generation" cooperative using field interviews with grower members and company management. We describe changes, before and after the buyout, in the contractual apparatus used for procuring live turkeys, and in the communication requirements, work expectations, and financial positions of growers. During the private ownership period, most of the inputs (except labor and facilities) were provided by the firm; there was substantial supervision of the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Procurement; Financial contracting; Agriculture; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18583 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Ligon, Ethan. |
| This paper estimates an agency model of contracts used in California's processing-tomato industry. Model estimation proceeds in three stages. We first estimate growers' stochastic production possibilities, and then, for a given vector of preference parameters, compute an optimal compensation schedule. Finally, we compare computed compensations with actual compensations and choose preference parameters to minimize distance between the two. Assuming perfect competition and risk neutrality for processors, we obtain an estimate of .08 for growers' measure of constant absolute risk aversion (where returns are measured in units of $100/ton), and find that growers' effort cost is 1.8% of total operating cost. Welfare losses from information constraints are... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20560 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Lawrence, John D.; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| Participants in U.S. markets for live cattle increasingly rely on federal grading standards to price slaughtered animals. This change is due to the growing prominence of grid pricing mechanisms that specify explicit premiums and discounts contingent on an animal's graded quality class. Although there have been recent changes in the way cattle are priced, the technology for sorting animals into quality classes has changed very little: human graders visually inspect each slaughtered carcass and call a quality and yieldgrade in a matter of seconds as the carcass passes on a moving trolley. There is anecdotal evidence of systematic bias in these called grades across time and regions within U.S. markets, and this paper empirically examines whether such... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cattle markets; Grader bias; Quality measurement; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18474 |
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| Marcoul, Philippe; Lawrence, John D.; Hueth, Brent. |
| Participants in U.S. markets for live cattle increasingly rely on federal grading standards to price slaughtered animals. This change is due to the growing prominence of "grid" pricing mechanisms that specify explicit premiums and discounts contingent on an animal's graded quality class. Although these changes alter the way cattle are priced, the technology for sorting animals into quality classes has changed very little: human graders visually inspect each slaughtered carcass and call a "quality" and "yield" grade in a matter of seconds as the carcass passes on a moving trolley. There is anecdotal evidence of systematic bias in these called grades across time and regions within U.S. markets. We examine whether such claims are supported in a sample of... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21123 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| We study incentives for information sharing (about uncertain future demand for final output) among firms in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output. Information sharing generally leads to increases in expected total welfare but may reduce expected firm profits. Even when expected firm profits increase, information sharing does not represent equilibrium behavior because firms face a prisoner?s dilemma in which it is privately rational for each firm to withhold information, given that other firms report truthfully. This equilibrium can be overcome if firms commit to simultaneously reporting their information and if reports are verifiable. We argue that agricultural bargaining associations serve both these roles. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural markets; Bargaining; Imperfect competition; Information; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18576 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| We study incentives for information sharing (about uncertain future demand for final output) among agricultural intermediaries in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output. Information sharing always increases expected grower and consumer surplus, but may reduce expected intermediary profits. Even when expected intermediary profits increase with information sharing, firms face a Prisoner's Dilemma where it is privately rational for each firm to withhold information, given that other firms report truthfully. This equilibrium can be avoided if firms' information reports are verifiable, and if firms commit to an ex ante contract that forces ex post information revelation. We argue that agricultural bargaining represents one means to achieve... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22232 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Lawrence, John D.. |
| The declining share of beef in total U.S. meat consumption has motivated industry-wide efforts to improve average beef quality through more effective coordination among the various market participants. Increased use of explicit "grid" pricing mechanisms over the last decade represent initial efforts at improved coordination. More recent efforts include animal-specific carcass data collection, with subsequent transmission to feeders and the relevant cow/calf operations, and improved "source verification" procedures aimed at (among other things) reducing the overall cost of medical treatment for live animals. None of these organizational innovations is costless, and indeed a number of significant barriers must be overcome before more widespread adoption of... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21989 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Lawrence, John D.. |
| The declining share of beef in total U.S. meat consumption has motivated industry-wide efforts to improve average beef quality through more effective coordination among the various market participants. Increased use of explicit grid pricing mechanisms over the last decade represents initial efforts at improved coordination. More recent efforts include animal-specific carcass data collection, with subsequent transmission to feeders and the relevant cow/calf operations, and improved source verification procedures aimed at (among other things) reducing the overall cost of medical treatment for live animals. None of these organizational innovations is costless, and indeed a number of significant barriers must be overcome before more widespread adoption of such... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Marketing; Production Economics; Cattle and beef markets; Information transmission; Producer alliance. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57703 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Lawrence, John D.. |
| The declining share of beef in total U.S. meat consumption has motivated industry-wide efforts to improve average beef quality through more effective coordination among the various market participants. Increased use of explicit grid pricing mechanisms over the last decade represents initial efforts at improved coordination. More recent efforts include animal-specific carcass data collection, with subsequent transmission to feeders and the relevant cow/calf operations, and improved source verification procedures aimed at (among other things) reducing the overall cost of medical treatment for live animals. None of these organizational innovations is costless, and indeed a number of significant barriers must be overcome before more widespread adoption of such... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Cattle and beef markets; Information transmission; Producer alliance; Livestock Production/Industries; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57704 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Ligon, Ethan; Melkonyan, Tigran A.. |
| We examine interactions among explicit and implicit contracting practices for a sample of 385 intermediaries in California fruit and vegetable markets. Explicit practices are measured with an indicator for the existence of a formal contract, and with indicators for various contract specifications (e.g., target delivery date, volume, acreage). Implicit practices are measured directly with a question about the existence of an “implicit understanding,” and indirectly with questions about the extent of informal involvement in farm-level decision making. Firms that manufacture processed foods, and that grow in house a portion of their total farm input, are significantly more likely to report use of explicit and implicit contracting practices. Additionally,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6068 |
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| Registros recuperados: 30 | |
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